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Maryland Health Care Reform Simulation Model: Detailed Analysis and Methodology 
The Hilltop Institute at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County (UMBC), under 
agreement with the Maryland Health Benefit Exchange of the Maryland Department of Health 
and Mental Hygiene, has developed a Health Care Reform Simulation Model. The simulation 
model projects enrollment in the various health care coverage programs mandated by the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). It also projects increases in health care expenditures 
and estimates the economic impact of implementing the ACA on the state of Maryland through 
fiscal year (FY) 2020. 
The simulation model projects the flow of new funds through the state economy resulting from 
the provision of health care coverage to newly insured individuals.  Furthermore, the simulation 
model uses a standard economic analysis technique to forecast additional economic activity that 
will be generated from implementing the ACA.  
Introduction 
The federal health care reform law and the states’ implementation of its mandates will have a 
significant impact on health care expenditures in both the public and private sectors. Any current 
and future projections regarding additional expenditures and economic impact necessarily will be 
fluid and dependent on the various decisions that the state makes in implementing the ACA, as 
well as how various components of the delivery system—from the insurance markets to 
providers and consumers—respond to the reforms as they evolve. 
Consequently, the goal in developing the health care reform simulation model was to build a 
dynamic simulation model that can be updated so its projections are revised as data become 
available, conditions and factors change over time, and decisions are made by policymakers, 
employers, and consumers. The simulation model focuses on the new enrollments, expenditures, 
and economic activity resulting from health care reform. As such, the basic approach was to 
compare the new expenditures associated with health care reform with a baseline assumption of 
what those expenditures would have been in the absence of reform. 
In reviewing this methodology document, consider the following information: 
 The simulation model should be updated as actual data and decisions emerge. 
 The simulation model does not address the state’s baseline budget, including possible 
short-term challenges related to growth in Medicaid enrollment and other factors. 
Because these factors are independent of health care reform and are not an implication of 
the ACA itself, they are not included in the simulation model. 
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Overview of the Maryland Health Care Reform Simulation Model 
The Maryland health care reform simulation model consists of four major component models 
that determine the impact of implementing the ACA on Maryland’s health care expenditures and 
economy: the population, employment, health care expenditure, and economic impact models.  
Population Model 
The population model uses projections of Maryland’s total population by age group, and number 
of uninsured individuals, by age group and federal poverty level (FPL), to both estimate the 
number of people who will be eligible for Medicaid expansion and project the number of 
individuals who are currently eligible yet not enrolled in Medicaid, but who are likely to enroll 
with implementation of the health care reform law (described as the “woodwork effect”). The 
model also projects the number of uninsured people who are candidates for coverage through the 
Maryland Health Benefits Exchange (the Exchange). It uses population projection data from the 
Maryland Department of Planning, as well as estimates of the number of uninsured individuals, 
by age group and FPL, derived from the 2011 Current Population Survey, which is conducted by 
the U.S. Census Bureau.  
Employment Model  
The employment model projects total employment and employer-sponsored insurance coverage 
in the state. This model uses data from Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), conducted 
by the federal Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), and employment data from 
the Maryland Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation. In addition, the model uses the 
long-term economic forecast published by the U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO), entitled 
“The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2012 to 2022,” which forecasts the national 
unemployment rate. The employment model contains three simulation sub-models, which are 
based on the publicly available literature: 
 Employer offer of insurance 
 Employee take-up of insurance 
 Direct purchase of insurance  
Health Care Expenditure Model 
The Health Care Expenditure Model forecasts summaries of new health care expenditures, 
including state expenditures and out-of pocket expenditures of individuals with new health care 
coverage, to estimate total new health care expenditures. The estimates of health care 
expenditures are based on projections of the population and employment models that are specific 
to Maryland, as well as detailed calculations based on the ACA. The expenditure model projects 
expenditures for:  
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1. Medicaid coverage expansion to individuals below 139 percent of the FPL1  
2. Transfer of Primary Adult Care (PAC) program enrollees to Medicaid expansion 
3. Medicaid "woodwork" effect 
4. Medicaid and Maryland Children’s Health Program (MCHP) administration expenditures 
5. Total health care expenditures through the Exchange 
6. Expenditures for increasing payments to primary care physicians to 100 percent of 
Medicare fees 
7. State Employees and Retirees Health Insurance 
The expenditure model also forecasts new expenditures from individuals for copayments and 
deductibles, and new federal funds that will flow into the state economy, including subsidies (tax 
credits) paid to individuals with incomes between 133 and 400 percent of the FPL for purchasing 
health insurance coverage through the Exchange, and payments for Medicaid expansion.  
Economic Impact Model 
To estimate the economic impact of the ACA on the state of Maryland, the simulation model 
uses projections of the flow of new funds through the state economy, resulting from the 
provision of health care coverage for newly insured individuals.  We used IMPLAN
2
 economic 
modeling software to estimate additional economic activity that will be generated from increased 
expenditures in the health care sector. IMPLAN uses Maryland-specific data for its projection of 
new economic activities. The software employs a standard mathematical economic technique 
called input-output model
3
 to project additional economic activity that will be generated from 
implementing the ACA.  
The sub-models of the Maryland health care reform simulation model are explained in more 
detail below. 
                                                 
1
 The Affordable Care Act expands Medicaid eligibility to people with income up to 133 percent of FPL. It also 
allows 5 percent income disregard for determining eligibility for Medicaid, effectively raising Medicaid eligibility 
income level to 138 percent of FPL. 
 
2 
Additional information regarding IMPLAN software is available at:  http://implan.com/V4/Index.php 
 
3
 The input-output model was developed by Wassily Leontief in1941, who won the Nobel Prize in 1973 for 
developing the model.  Further information about the input-output model is available at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Input-output_model 
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Detailed Description of the Maryland Health Care Reform Simulation Model 
Population Model 
To determine the number of individuals who are eligible for the current Medicaid and PAC 
programs, we used the following methodology and data sources to estimate Maryland population 
by age group, disability status, and FPL status: 
The U.S. Census Bureau released the 2010 Census data for Maryland’s population by age group.  
The Maryland Department of Planning provided population projections by age group through the 
year 2020. We used rates of growth implicit in the population projections by age group to project 
Maryland’s population through 2020. Table 1 shows population projections in five-year 
increments. 
 Table 1. Maryland Population Projections by Age Group 
Age Group 2010 2015 2020 
0-4 364,488 374,765 384,736 
5-20 1,230,877 1,222,078 1,251,775 
21-44 1,872,572 1,873,512 1,941,528 
45-64 1,597,972 1,651,143 1,637,289 
65+ 707,642 840,515 1,000,827 
Total 5,773,551 5,962,013 6,216,155 
Source: Maryland Department of Planning, March 2012 Forecast  
The U.S. Census Bureau publishes data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2011). The CPS data for Maryland provided estimates of population distribution by age 
group, disability, and FPL status. Tables 2 and 3 show the CPS data for 2010. 
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Table 2. Maryland Disabled Population  
by Percentage of Federal Poverty Level and Age, 2010  
Percentage of Federal 
Poverty Level (FPL)  
Age Group Total 
 
0-20 21-64 
65 and 
older  
Under 50%  5,355 31,633 10,248 47,236 
50 - 99 %  857 44,167 29,003 74,027 
100 - 124%  1,090 13,932 16,141 31,163 
125 - 199%  1,957 37,948 52,024 91,929 
200 - 299%  3,024 36,369 52,582 91,975 
300 - 399%  3,188 40,395 41,271 84,854 
400% +   8,270 82,329 71,304 161,903 
Total 23,741 286,773 272,573 583,087 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau. Current Population Survey, 2011 
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Table 3. Maryland Non-Disabled Population  
by Percentage of Federal Poverty Level and Age, 2010 
Percentage of Federal 
Poverty Level (FPL) 
Age Group Total 
 
0-20 21-64 
65 and 
older  
Under 50%  29,877 146,256 15,714 191,847 
50 - 99 %  28,204 155,302 27,880 211,386 
100 - 124%  16,457 92,246 27,006 135,709 
125 - 199%  71,774 371,495 76,037 519,306 
200 - 299%  78,840 503,257 102,927 685,024 
300 - 399%  73,268 515,893 75,848 665,009 
400% +   291,287 2,246,555 250,160 2,788,002 
Total 589,707 4,031,004 575,572 5,196,283 
Total Disabled and 
Non-Disabled (sum of 
Tables 2 and 3) 
613,448 4,317,777 848,145 5,779,370 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau. Current Population Survey, 2011 
We then estimated an econometric model that forecasted Maryland’s unemployment rate as a 
function of the national unemployment rate. The R-squared
4
 for the model is approximately 99 
percent. The econometric model is a linear regression of Maryland’s unemployment rate as a 
function of the national unemployment rate. Monthly data for 2005 through 2010 were used for 
estimation of the econometric model. Although a small amount of auto-correlation was present in 
the data, because the estimated model was applied to annual unemployment rates, it was not 
problematic for forecasting purposes. 
                                                 
4
 R-squared shows the goodness of fit and level of accuracy of the estimated model. A perfect fit of the estimated 
model to the data has an R-squared equal to 100 percent. 
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Next, we used the long-term economic forecast published by the CBO, entitled “The Budget and 
Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2012 to 2022,” which forecasts the national unemployment rate. 
Using the CBO’s forecast and the estimated econometric model of the relationship between 
Maryland’s unemployment rate and that of the nation, we forecasted Maryland’s unemployment 
rate through 2020. Table 4 shows the unemployment rate projections for the nation and for 
Maryland through 2020. 
Table 4. Unemployment Rate Projections for the United States and Maryland, 2012-2020  
Unemployment Rate 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
United States  8.8% 9.1% 8.7% 7.4% 6.3% 5.7% 5.5% 5.5% 5.4% 
Maryland  6.9% 7.0% 6.9% 5.8% 5.0% 4.5% 4.3% 4.3% 4.3% 
The population projection data were used in conjunction with the CPS data in Tables 2 and 3 to 
derive estimates of population by age group, disability, and poverty status for the 2010 to 2020 
period. For this projection, we also utilized research demonstrating that changes in the 
distribution of population by FPL status are related to the unemployment rate (Gruber & Levitt, 
2002). Then, we derived estimates of projected population below 138 percent of the FPL, based 
on the number of people below 125 percent of the FPL, plus a portion of the number of people 
between 125 and 199 percent of the FPL. 
In the next step, we used actual Medicaid enrollment data to derive take-up (i.e., participation) 
rates for the population with disability and the population with no disability. To establish a 
baseline, we projected Medicaid enrollment by disability status without health care reform. Then, 
we derived projections of Medicaid enrollment by disability status, age group, and poverty status 
under current laws, in which changes in Medicaid enrollment primarily reflect changes in 
economic conditions and increases in Maryland’s overall population.  We also used actual 
enrollment data for the PAC program to derive the take-up rate in this program and project PAC 
enrollment through the forecast period. 
Subsequently, we assumed that, to implement health care reform in Maryland, the state will 
employ aggressive outreach programs to enroll currently eligible individuals who have not 
participated in the Medicaid program. To project the woodwork effect, we considered the 
increase in Medicaid enrollment in currently eligible individuals, beginning in 2014, based on 
health care reform effects such as Medicaid expansion, the individual mandate, and creation of 
the insurance Exchange. Based on an Urban Institute study (Holahan, Kenney, & Pelletier 2010), 
we assumed that individuals who enroll due to the woodwork effect would have better health 
status than existing Medicaid enrollees with disability. In other words, take-up is related to health 
status (i.e., selection bias) (The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, 2010), such that individuals 
who enroll due to the woodwork effect will be less disabled, and their health status will be 
similar to the current Medicaid expansion enrollees. Consequently, we assumed that most 
eligible individuals with a disability will have enrolled in the Medicaid program by 2014, and 
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that there will be minor increases in take-up rates for people with disabilities in 2015 and 2016. 
We also assumed modest increases in take-up rates for the population with no disability. 
We assumed that enrollment in the PAC program of childless adults with incomes below 116 
percent of the FPL will increase substantially in 2014, 2015, and 2016, as the benefit package 
available to these individuals becomes the comprehensive Medicaid benefits, which fulfills many 
of their unmet needs (Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., 2009). These projections were used as 
part of the enrollment projections for Medicaid expansion (up to 138 percent of the FPL).  
Because childless adults who are enrolled in PAC do not have full Medicaid coverage, these 
individuals will be considered as part of the Medicaid expansion population beginning in January 
2014. As such, this population’s projected enrollment is included in the Medicaid expansion 
enrollment.  
Eligibility for Medicaid Expansion and Coverage through the Exchange   
We used CPS data regarding the total number of uninsured individuals and the number of non-
citizen uninsured individuals in Maryland by age group and income as a percentage of FPL 
status. Based on these data, we estimated the number of uninsured U.S. citizens in Maryland who 
would be eligible for Medicaid expansion coverage or for coverage through the Exchange 
(Tables 5 and 6). 
Table 5. Total Number of Uninsured Individuals in Maryland 
by Percentage of Federal Poverty Level in 2009 and 2010 
 
Age 
Group 
Percentage of Federal Poverty Level (FPL)  
 
Total 
Below 
50% 
50% to 
below 
125% 
125% to 
below 
150% 
150% to 
below 
200% 
200% to 
below 
400% 
400% 
and 
above 
0-20 16,494 28,148 18,267 27,038 36,608 13,949 140,504 
21-64 72,196 92,286 48,626 88,316 189,177 105,635 596,236 
65 and 
older 
2,216 2,240 1,353 634 4,362 1,795 12,600 
Total 90,906 122,674 68,246 115,988 230,147 121,380 749,340 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2011. 
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Table 6. Number of Uninsured U.S. Citizens in Maryland 
by Percentage of Federal Poverty Level in 2009 and 2010 
 
Age 
Group 
Percentage of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL) 
 
Total 
Below 
50% 
50% to 
below 
125% 
125% to 
below 
150% 
150% to 
below 
200% 
200% to 
below 
400% 
400% 
and 
above 
0-20 15,739 23,610 15,897 23,253 34,855 13,450 126,804 
21-64 53,349 61,742 27,398 54,471 137,706 95,736 430,402 
65 and 
older  
2,216 1,709 344 634 2,336 977 8,216 
Total 71,304 87,061 43,639 78,358 174,897 110,163 565,422 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2011. 
To derive the number of U.S. citizens in Maryland who are eligible for Medicaid expansion (up 
to 138 percent of the FPL) and subsidized coverage through the Exchange (between 138 and 400 
percent of the FPL), the following analysis was performed: 
We divided the estimated number of uninsured people in each age group and FPL status category 
by the total population in the same age group to derive the percentage of individuals in each age 
group who are uninsured and living below certain FPL levels. To project the uninsured 
population, we first used the estimated econometric model for forecasting Maryland’s 
unemployment rate as a function of the national unemployment rate. We used the CBO’s long-
term economic forecast of the national unemployment rate through 2020, as well as an analysis 
prepared by Jonathan Gruber of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and Larry Levitt of the Henry J. Kaiser Family 
Foundation (Gruber & Levitt, 2002). The analysis uses alternative statistical approaches to 
estimate the percentage point change in the uninsured rate for each percentage point change in 
the unemployment rate. The results range from 0.43 to 0.57. We used a midpoint estimate 
between the respective approaches of 0.50 for analysis of the effects of changes in the 
unemployment rate on the number of uninsured individuals. The statistical model shows that as 
the unemployment rate increases, the number of people with employer-sponsored insurance 
(ESI) falls, and the number of people with public coverage (e.g., Medicaid) rises, although not 
enough to fully absorb the impact of the decline in employer coverage. This dynamic helps to 
explain the rapid growth in Medicaid enrollment in recent years, which primarily has been 
caused by the economic recession. This method also addresses the so-called “crowd-out effect” 
or “substitution effect,” whereby people formerly covered by ESI enroll in Medicaid and the 
Maryland’s Children Health Insurance Program (MCHP). 
We projected that, with the economic recovery, increases in employment would likely be found 
in the retail and service sectors, which are less likely to offer insurance coverage to their 
employees. To predict the number of uninsured individuals by age group and FPL status that will 
be eligible for coverage under Medicaid expansion, population projections were multiplied by 
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the percentage of people in each age group who are predicted to be uninsured and below certain 
FPL levels. This estimate provided projections of the uninsured population by age group and 
FPL status for 2012 through 2020.  
In subsequent steps, we estimated the number of people who would be eligible for Medicaid 
expansion and insurance coverage through the Maryland Health Benefits Exchange, with or 
without federal subsidies. Then, we used take-up rates by FPL status to project the number of 
people, by disability and FPL status that would enroll in Medicaid expansion.  
The information above describes the methodology and data sources used in the population model 
of the Maryland health care reform simulation model. 
Employment Model 
The sources of most of the data used for the employment model are the Maryland Department of 
Labor, Licensing, and Regulation (DLLR) and the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. As described 
above, the employment model projects total employment and employer-sponsored insurance 
coverage in the state of Maryland. 
To project total employment through 2020, we used population projections for individuals aged 
21 to 64. Then, using projections of labor force participation rates, we estimated the Maryland 
civilian labor force through the year 2020. Next, we applied projections of Maryland’s 
unemployment rates, using the econometric model described above, to estimate total civilian 
employment in Maryland through 2020. Subsequently, we subtracted employment by 
government and educational institutions to derive projections of employment by private firms. 
The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics publishes data from the Quarterly Census of Employment 
and Wages program, which was used to estimate Maryland’s 2010 employment by firms in three 
categories: those with less than 50 employees, 50 to 100 employees, and more than 100 
employees.   
We conducted an extensive review of literature on employers’ decisions to offer health care 
insurance, employees’ decisions to take up their employers’ offers of insurance, and direct 
purchase of insurance (Blumberg, Nichols, & Banthin, 2001; Hadley & Reschovsky, 2002; 
Gruber & Lettaub, 2004; Gruber & Washington, 2005; Liu & Chollet, 2006; Heim & Lurie, 
2009). A summary of the literature is included in Appendix A of this report.   
The three sub-models of the employment model that were used to project the numbers of people 
with health care coverage through ESI and direct purchase of insurance are: employer offer of 
insurance, employee take-up of insurance and direct purchase of insurance. Variables that affect 
these sub-models include the state unemployment rate, price of medical care, insurance 
premiums, employee premiums, employer penalty under the ACA for individuals not enrolled, 
percentage of premium costs covered by employer, state income tax rate, average workers’ 
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income, and percentage of workers in firms of different sizes (i.e., less than 50, 50-100, and more 
than 100 employees). 
Employer Offer of Insurance 
The Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, Insurance Component (MEPS-IC)
5
 provides estimates 
of the percentage of Maryland firms of different sizes that offered health care coverage to their 
employees in 2010. We used these estimates to calibrate the econometric model that projects the 
number of employers that will offer insurance coverage to their employees -- with and without 
federal health care reform -- through 2020. The baseline model shows a decline in the percentage 
of some firms that offer health care insurance without federal reform. This decline reflects the 
assumption that the country’s economic recovery will primarily occur through expansion of 
employers in the retail and service sectors, which are less likely to offer health care insurance 
coverage to their employees. Under federal health care reform, the percentage of employers that 
offer health insurance to employees shows a slightly greater decline than that in the baseline 
(without health care reform). This phenomenon primarily is due to the effects of variables that 
influence employers’ decisions to offer health care coverage to their employees. For example, 
some employers may decide to pay penalties to the federal government and stop offering 
insurance coverage to their employees.  
Employee Take-Up of Insurance 
The MEPS data described above also report the percentage of employees who take up their 
employers’ offer of health care coverage. As described above, econometric models project the 
employees’ take-up of insurance through 2020 for firms of different sizes. Because of the ACA’s 
individual mandate, it is expected that the employees’ take-up rate will increase in 2014 and the 
subsequent years after implementation of federal health care reform.  
By multiplying the projected numbers of employees in different-sized firms (i.e., less than 50, 50 
to 100, and more than 100 employees) by the corresponding percentages of firms that offer 
health care insurance coverage to their employees and the percentages of employees who take up 
insurance, we forecasted the numbers of employees, by different-sized firms, who will have ESI 
coverage. Then, we multiplied the number of employees with ESI coverage by their average 
family size to project the total number of people with ESI coverage. The MEPS data on number 
of people with ESI coverage in Maryland were used to calibrate the models that project the 
number of people with ESI through 2020.  
                                                 
5 
The federal Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) sponsors the various components of MEPS. 
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Direct Purchase of Insurance 
To estimate the number of people who would purchase insurance coverage through the 
Exchange, first we estimated the number of employed individuals without ESI coverage, by 
subtracting the total number of employees that take up insurance coverage from the projected 
total number of employees of private firms. Then the number of employed individuals without 
ESI coverage was multiplied by the projected probability of direct purchase of insurance 
coverage, which is generated by an econometric model, to project the number of people who 
would purchase insurance coverage through the Exchange.  
Expenditure Model Output Spreadsheet 
In the following section of this methodology document, we explain the specific components of 
estimates in each row of the Expenditure model output spreadsheet, which summarizes the 
expenditures related to implementing the ACA in Maryland. The numbers in the following 
sections correspond to the categories and rows in the Expenditure model output spreadsheet.  
I. Total New Health Care Expenditures 
1. Expenditure for Medicaid Expansion 
One of the sources consulted for estimating the size of new Medicaid enrollment in Maryland, 
including Medicaid expansion and the Medicaid woodwork effect, was a report produced by the 
Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation and authored by researchers of the Urban Institute (Holahan 
& Headen, 2010).  
To derive the number of individuals who would become eligible for Medicaid expansion in 
2014, we conducted the following analysis:  
First, the numbers of uninsured U.S. citizens aged 21 to 64 years, by disability status, who are 
under 139 percent of the FPL, were estimated for the Medicaid expansion population. Next, the 
resulting numbers were multiplied by Medicaid take-up rates to project the number of new 
enrollees. We consulted studies by King, Slifkin, and Holmes (2009) and Selden, Banthin, and 
Cohen (1998) regarding Medicaid take-up rates. Based on recent evidence from health care 
reform in Massachusetts, only minimal effects of the crowd-out of private insurance coverage 
were included beyond the economic and unemployment factors to avoid double counting the 
effects of crowd-out of ESI (Long & Stockley, 2010). 
We used the following formula to derive the expenditures for Medicaid expansion for each year 
of the 2014 to 2020 period. 
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Expenditure for Medicaid expansion in year i =  
(Number of new Medicaid enrollees from Medicaid expansion in year i)  
Multiplied by  
(Average health care costs per Medicaid enrollee in year i) 
To project the average health care cost per Medicaid enrollee, we used Maryland’s managed care 
capitation rates, by age group for the base year. For the projected new Medicaid-eligible 
individuals with and without a disability, we used weighted average capitation rates, plus fee-for-
service wraparound costs, derived from payments to managed care organizations (MCOs) for 
these Medicaid enrollees. On a weighted average basis, Maryland’s per member per year cost for 
Families and Children Medicaid enrollees in FY 2012 was $4,163; for individuals with 
disability, the cost was $18,137. 
Next, we trended these per capita costs into each of the future fiscal years. The Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) published National Health Expenditure Projections, 
2011-2021, which includes forecasts of change in “Health Expenditures per Capita” and other 
health care expenditures. This source was used to project the costs associated with implementing 
health care reform in Maryland for the period of 2011 to 2020 (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services, 2012). We used the forecasts of change in “Health Expenditures per Capita” to trend 
the base year (2012) capitation rates to 2014 and subsequent years to reflect the projected 
increase in medical costs, on a per capita basis, during the period. As shown in the formula 
above, by multiplying the projected number of new Medicaid enrollees from Medicaid expansion 
in each year by the corresponding projection of health care costs, by disability status, the total 
expenditure for Medicaid expansion in each year was estimated. 
Based on these methods and our data sources, as of July 12, 2012, the estimated expenditures for 
Medicaid expansion enrollees (excluding PAC program enrollees) for FY 2014 through FY 2020 
are $2,649 million. This figure is reflected as the midpoint cost on the Expenditure model output 
spreadsheet. 
2. Transfer of PAC Program Enrollees to Medicaid Expansion 
The PAC program enrollees currently receive a limited health care benefits package, which 
excludes hospital services. After implementation of Medicaid expansion in January 2014, PAC 
program enrollees will be considered part of the Medicaid expansion population. They will be 
enrolled in Medicaid and receive the full Medicaid benefits package, and the state will receive 
enhanced federal medical assistance percentage (FMAP) rates for their entire benefits.  FMAP is 
the percentage that the federal government pays toward Medicaid costs. The cost of PAC 
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program enrollees that is currently matched at the FMAP rates of 50 percent will be matched at 
the enhanced Medicaid expansion FMAP levels beginning January 2014.
6
  
The current PAC capitation rates were projected through FY 2020 using the forecasts of change 
in “Health Expenditures per Capita” from CMS, as if federal health care reform did not occur. 
We multiplied the projected number of PAC enrollees through FY 2020 by the projected annual 
capitation rates for the limited benefits package in PAC to estimate the baseline costs in the 
absence of health care reform, against which the effects of the ACA will be measured. 
Next, to estimate the cost of PAC enrollees under the ACA, we multiplied the projected number 
of PAC enrollees by the projected full-benefit annual payments for current Medicaid expansion 
enrollees, and added 10 percent costs to account for the sicker population of PAC enrollees 
compared with current Medicaid expansion enrollees.  
As of July 12, 2012, the estimated total additional expenditures for transferring PAC enrollees to 
the Medicaid expansion program for FY 2014 through FY 2020 are $2,165 million. This figure is 
reflected as the midpoint cost on the Expenditure model output spreadsheet. 
3. Expenditures for the Medicaid Woodwork Effect 
Previously published research demonstrates that knowledge gaps among parents partially explain 
the reason for children of low-income families that remain without health insurance. For 
example, one study (Kenney, Haley, & Tebay, 2003) showed that nearly 30 percent of low-
income parents had not heard of SCHIP, and 40 percent did not understand that their children 
could be eligible for health care coverage, even if they were not enrolled in welfare. 
Additionally, an estimated 7 percent of uninsured children lack coverage because their parents do 
not think that they need it (Hill, Stockdale, Evert, & Gifford, 2006).  
We estimated the expenditures for the Medicaid “woodwork effects” using the same 
methodology that was used for Medicaid expansion, as described above. We included the 
uninsured population in the 0-20 and 21-64 age categories as potential new enrollees. 
Furthermore, we assumed that Maryland will seek to enroll a relatively high percentage of the 
currently eligible population and projected a woodwork effect enrollment of 44,069 individuals 
at the point of full implementation of health care reform in FY 2020. As of July 12, 2012, the 
estimated expenditures for the Medicaid woodwork effect for FY 2014 through FY 2020 are 
$2,033 million. This figure is reflected as the midpoint cost on the Expenditure model output 
spreadsheet.  
                                                 
6
 The FMAP for Medicaid expansion enrollees will be 100 percent in federal fiscal year (FFY) 2014 through FFY 
2016; it will decrease to 95 percent in FFY 2017, 94 percent in FFY 2018, 93 percent in FFY 2019, and 90 percent 
in FFY 2020 and subsequent years. 
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4. Medicaid and the Maryland Children’s Health Insurance Program Administration Costs 
To estimate the increased cost of Medicaid and MCHP administration, we added the projected 
total expenditures of Medicaid expansion (including the PAC program’s new expenditures) to 
the projected total expenditures of the Medicaid woodwork effect and multiplied that sum by the 
estimated administrative cost percentage of 5 percent, which is a historic average administrative 
(overhead) cost. Overhead costs finance the outreach, enrollment, and eligibility determinations 
related to the substantial increase in Medicaid enrollment, as well as various programmatic 
oversight activities. 
To develop the necessary eligibility systems with which to comply with the eligibility 
determination requirements of the ACA, we included $20 million in additional administrative 
costs in FY 2012, $40 million in FY 2013, and $40 million in FY 2014, for a total of $100 
million in total funds. As of July 12, 2012, the estimated expenditures for Medicaid and MCHP 
administration for FY 2014 through FY 2020 are $442 million. This figure is reflected as the 
midpoint cost on the Expenditure model output spreadsheet.  
5. Expenditures for Health Care Coverage through the Exchange 
We estimated total health care expenditures for coverage of individuals who obtain insurance 
through the Exchange by multiplying the average per capita health care expenditures by the 
projected number of Exchange enrollees.  
America’s Health Insurance Plans (AHIP) conducted surveys of small group insurance plans in 
2009 and 2011, and a survey of individual health insurance plans in 2009. These surveys 
provided estimates of premiums for insurance coverage through small group and individual 
markets. AHIP member companies responding to the survey were asked to include only 
individual comprehensive or major medical coverage that was guaranteed renewable and met the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) definitions of “creditable 
coverage.” For individual market annual cost estimate of $5,112, we added $2,756 for co-
payments and deductibles for an annual total cost estimate per individual of $7,868. Then we 
multiplied this number by 70 percent to derive the premium costs of $5,508 for a silver plan
7
. 
Next, we added a trend estimate to arrive at the total cost estimate of $5,746 for FY 2011. Based 
on our methodology and these cost estimates, as of July 12, 2012, the estimated expenditures for 
insurance coverage through the Exchange for FY 2014 through FY 2020 are $10.8 billion. This 
figure is reflected as the midpoint cost on the Expenditure model output spreadsheet.  
                                                 
7
 According to the ACA: “A plan in the silver level shall provide a level of coverage that is designed to provide 
benefits that are actuarially equivalent to 70 percent of the full actuarial value of the benefits provided under the 
plan.” 
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6. Insurance Exchange Administrative Costs 
Administrative costs will be incurred in operating the Exchange. The federal government will 
fund 100 percent of these costs through December 31, 2014. After federal funds are 
discontinued, the Exchange must become self-sustaining through user fees and/or assessments on 
carriers. For the purposes of this model, we used a reasonable administrative cost assumption of 
$15 million in FY 2013 and $30 million in FY 2014, with a 2 percent annual increase of 
administrative cost in subsequent years, for a total of $238 million for the FY 2013 through FY 
2020 period. This figure is reflected as the midpoint cost on the Expenditure model output 
spreadsheet. This section of the Expenditure model should be updated as decisions are made and 
new cost estimates become available. 
7.  Expenditures for Increasing Medicaid Primary Care Physician Fees to 100 Percent of 
Medicare 
Under the health care reform law, the federal government will pay for increasing Medicaid 
reimbursement rates for Evaluation and Management (E&M) procedures and immunization 
administration services provided by primary care physicians (PCPs, defined as physicians 
specializing in family medicine, general internal medicine, and pediatric medicine) to 100 
percent of the Medicare payment rates for calendar years (CYs) 2013 and 2014. For services 
furnished on or after January 1, 2013, and before January 1, 2015, states will receive 100 percent 
federal financing for increasing PCP payment rates from the rates in effect on July 1, 2009. The 
increase will apply to both fee-for-service and managed care services.  
We developed a physician fee payment model to determine the amount of increase in Maryland’s 
Medicaid reimbursement rates for PCPs. CYs 2013 and 2014 fall into three separate state fiscal 
years, FY 2013, FY 2014, and FY 2015.  To estimate the total increase in payments for the three 
fiscal years, the physician fee payment model was used to determine the cost of increasing PCP 
fees to 100 percent of Medicare fees. Based on the physician fee payment model, after 
accounting for utilization and enrollment increases between the base year and the fee increase 
fiscal year, it would cost $75 million to increase physician fees for E&M and immunization 
administration procedures to 100 percent of Medicare fees in FY 2013. The increase in payments 
would be approximately $166 million in FY 2014 and $91 million in FY 2015, for total 
payments of $332 million. This figure is reflected as the midpoint cost on the Expenditure model 
output spreadsheet. 
8. State Employees and Retirees Health Insurance 
The state of Maryland will incur new costs as an employer and as a provider of health insurance 
to retired state employees. The overall net new costs are a function of seven separate factors, 
some of which result in net savings or new revenue for the state, and some of which result in net 
new costs for the state. The seven independent factors are: the early retiree reinsurance program, 
the comparative effectiveness tax, the cost of extending dependent coverage to age 26, insurance 
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costs related to contractual employees, the tax on high-cost health plans, automatic enrollment 
and subsidies, and related administrative costs. The figures found in the Expenditure model 
output reflect the annual and aggregate effects of these seven factors. Overall, through the period 
of FY 2012 to FY 2020, the costs of state employee and retiree health insurance are projected to 
increase. The data were prepared by the state’s Department of Budget and Management (DBM) 
and incorporated into the model without any adjustment. The estimated additional expenditures 
for active and retired state employees through FY 2020 are $173 million. This figure represents 
the midpoint cost estimate. 
9. Administrative Costs for Other State Agencies 
This line represents a marginal increase in administrative costs at agencies such as the Maryland 
Insurance Administration (MIA) and the DBM, as well as general state outreach activities. For 
the purposes of this model, we used a reasonable administrative assumption of $2 million in 
additional expenditures per year for FY 2012 and FY 2013, and $4 million in additional 
expenditures per year for FY 2014 and subsequent years for these new marginal costs, which 
add-up to $32 for the forecast period. 
II. Federal Assessments, Subsidies, and Cost Sharing  
1.  Federal Assessment of Employers 
Under the ACA, employers with fewer than 50 employees will be exempt from penalties for not 
providing health insurance coverage to their employees. However, the ACA will assess penalties 
to employers with 50 or more employees that do not offer coverage. Employers with 50 or more 
employees, whose employees receive premium tax credits, will be assessed a penalty of $2,000 
per employee, excluding the first 30 employees.  
The law also requires employers that offer insurance coverage to provide a voucher to employees 
with incomes less than 400 percent of the FPL, whose shares of the premium exceed 8 percent 
but are less than 9.8 percent of their incomes and who choose to enroll in a plan in the Exchange. 
Employers that provide vouchers will not be subject to penalties for employees who receive 
premium credits in the insurance Exchange. 
We predicted the amount of assessment per employee using the increase in medical cost 
inflation, as estimated by CMS. We also assumed that 50 percent of employers with 50 to 99 
employees and 20 percent of employers with 100 or more employees will either pay the 
assessments and not provide insurance coverage, or provide a free choice voucher to their 
employees (these assumptions can be changed in the Simulation Model input data). Based on 
these assumptions, the estimated total assessment of penalties to employers between FY 2014 to 
FY 2020 is $2.4 billion.  
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2. Federal Subsidy Payments for Individuals 
The federal premium subsidy is not meant to cover the full premium amount; there is an 
individual financial responsibility that is capped based on income levels.  According to the ACA, 
the amount that individuals with incomes less than 400 percent of the FPL will pay for 
purchasing insurance coverage is capped based on a sliding scale of income, as shown in Table 
7. 
Table 7. Maximum Payment from  
Individuals as a Percentage of Income 
Income as a  
Percentage of the FPL 
Maximum Payment as a 
Percentage of Income 
Up to 133% 2.00% 
134% to 150% 4.00% 
151% to 200%  6.30% 
201% to 250% 8.05% 
251% to 400%  9.50% 
We predicted the number of individuals who will purchase insurance coverage through the 
insurance Exchange by their income as a percentage of the FPL. We then used the maximum 
percentages corresponding to each income tier to predict the amounts of federal income tax 
credits that individuals will receive for purchasing insurance coverage through the Exchange. 
Based on our methods and data sources, as of July 12, 2012, the projected FY 2014 to FY 2020 
total federal subsidies in the form of tax credits is $5.1 billion.  
3. Federal Cost-Sharing Payments for Individuals 
Cost-sharing subsidies are payments by the federal government to offset the copayments of low-
income enrollees in the Exchange. We estimated cost sharing payments using a silver plan. 
Based on our methods and data sources, as of July 12, 2012, the projected FY 2014 to FY 2020 
total federal cost-sharing payment is $648 million. Like any federal program, Congress may 
choose to reduce the scope of cost-sharing subsidies; in fact, they have already been targeted by 
the federal government as a source of deficit reduction by the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011 
(Redhead, 2011). 
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III. Flow of New Funds through the State Economy and Impact on Providers 
from Additional Health Care Expenditures 
Analysis of the impact of the ACA on the state budget and finances shows that, because of such 
factors as savings in the MCHP program due to higher FMAP rates
8, extension of manufacturers’ 
drug rebates to Medicaid MCOs, and transfer of current PAC program enrollees to Medicaid 
expansion, the benefits to the state's budget of ACA implementation exceed its costs through 
2020.  Therefore, we have considered all additional health care expenditures related to 
implementation of the ACA, excluding out-of-pocket expenditures of individuals with new 
insurance coverage, as new funds that will flow through the state economy and will generate 
additional economic activity. 
 
The results of this section of the Expenditure model output are used as input to the IMPLAN 
input-output model, described above, to evaluate the impact of implementing the ACA on the 
state economy and to quantify the impact on total output generated throughout the state, the total 
number of new jobs created, and the unemployment rate. 
The Expenditure model predicts additional spending in the health care sector. However, the 
IMPLAN model uses health care spending in health provider industry categories, mainly: 
physician services, hospital care, pharmaceutical drugs, other health services including 
diagnostic services, and administrative costs. Therefore, the outputs of the Maryland Expenditure 
model are mapped to the IMPLAN industry categories to enable IMPLAN to estimate the 
broader economic impacts of changes in health care spending. 
To estimate the total impact of additional health care expenditures on various health care 
providers due to implementation of the ACA in Maryland, we first projected the total increase in 
health care expenditures related to all of the detailed items described above. Then, we examined 
various data sources for a breakdown of total health care expenditures into broad categories of 
providers (see Appendix B for details). Maryland’s Medicaid MCOs make periodic Health 
Finance Management Reports (HFMRs) to the state that provide more detailed allocations of 
health care expenditures by the provider types that render services to MCO enrollees. 
Furthermore, we compared percent expenditures by provider types over time, and took into 
account the effect of the projected reduction in uncompensated care on hospital costs to derive 
the related shares of all providers through FY 2020. 
Based on these sources, data in Table 8 were used to allocate the total new health care 
expenditures by type of provider. We assumed that these percentages would remain constant 
throughout the forecast period. In the Expenditure model, administrative costs are estimated 
                                                 
8 
Under the ACA, states will receive a 23 percent increase in the match rate for SCHIP, up to a maximum of 100 
percent, for FFY 2016 through FFY 2019. 
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separately from Medical costs, and IMPLAN has a separate input category for them. Hence, they 
are not included in Table 8. 
Table 8. Percent Allocation of Health Care Expenditures to Providers 
 Provider Type FY 14 FY 15 FY 16 FY 17 FY 18 FY 19 FY 20 
Total, All Professionals 22.6% 22.6% 22.6% 22.6% 22.6% 22.6% 22.6% 
Hospital Services 59.1% 58.1% 57.1% 56.1% 55.1% 54.1% 53.1% 
Pharmacy 10.0% 10.2% 10.4% 10.6% 10.8% 11.0% 11.2% 
Other Health Services 8.3% 9.1% 9.9% 10.7% 11.5% 12.3% 13.1% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Based on these percentage allocations, the total impact on providers due to the implementation of 
the ACA in Maryland were estimated, as described below. 
1. All Professional Services 
We estimated the total increase in payments for professional services, including those provided 
by physicians, dentists, and other health care professionals such as nurse practitioners. Based on 
these methods and our data sources, as of July 12, 2012, the projected total additional 
expenditures for all professional services for FY 2014 through FY 2020 is approximately $3.2 
billion. This amount includes additional expenditures for increasing Medicaid PCP fees to 100 
percent of Medicare fees. This figure is reflected as the midpoint of expenditures on the model 
output.  
2. Total Additional Expenditures for Hospital Services 
We also estimated the total increase in payments for hospitals services. Based on our methods 
and data sources, the projected total additional expenditures for hospital services for FY 2014 
through FY 2020 is approximately $4.9 billion. This number reflects a $3.1 billion reduction in 
hospital costs that will benefit all payers due to a reduction in uncompensated care for hospital 
services. 
3. Total Pharmacy and Other Health Services 
Similarly, we estimated the total increase in payments for pharmacy and other health services, 
such as laboratory tests and health clinic visits. Based on our methods and data sources, as of 
July 12, 2012, the projected FY 2014 to FY 2020 total additional expenditures for 
pharmaceutical drugs and services is $1.0 billion. Additional expenditures for other health 
services are projected to be $1.4 billion. 
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4. Administrative Costs  
The administrative costs shown here represent state administrative costs for Medicaid and 
MCHP programs, plus administrative costs for the Health Benefit Exchange, which are not 
accounted for in payments to health care service providers, but are new funds that will flow 
through the state economy and should be included as input to the input-output model. The 
projected total additional administrative costs through FY 2020 are approximately $596 million.  
The projected total additional funds for the FY 2014 to FY 2020 period are approximately $11.1 
billion, which will flow through Maryland’s economy. 
IV. Additional Health Care Expenditures by Individuals 
The health care reform simulation model calculates the out-of-pocket expenditures of individuals 
who purchase insurance coverage through the Exchange, based on the ACA law that specifies 
maximum out-of-pocket expenditures based on a person’s income as a percentage of the FPL 
(see Table 7). As of July 12, 2012, based on our methodology and data sources, the estimated 
total additional out-of-pocket expenditures of individuals for FY 2014 through FY 2020 are $5.1 
billion. This figure is reflected as the midpoint cost on the Expenditure model output 
spreadsheet. 
V. Additional Economic Activity Generated from Implementing the ACA:  
Impact on the State of Maryland Economy 
The Maryland Health Care Reform Simulation Model forecasts new expenditures in the health 
care sector following implementation of the ACA law. To analyze the impact of the new 
expenditures on the state’s economy, we used IMPLAN economic modeling software to estimate 
how new expenditures in the health care sector flow through other sectors of the economy to 
generate further economic activity.  
Input-Output Model  
The IMPLAN input-output model uses standardized data on how various industries transact with 
other industries for goods and services, that is, how the output of one industry becomes input to 
each of the other industries, adding to the final demand for consumption
9
. The model also takes 
into account the taxing of these transactions by the local, state, and federal governments. 
Furthermore, it determines the gross outputs of different industries that are required for a given 
increase in the final demand of one sector ― the health care sector in this context. 
                                                 
9 
The coefficients of input-output models for the U.S. economy are estimated by the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
of the U.S. Department of Commerce. 
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The IMPLAN input-output model measures the impact of new spending in three ways: direct, 
indirect, and induced spending. Direct spending relates to newly purchased goods and services, 
such as health care services produced by medical practices, hospitals, pharmacies, and other 
ancillary health services (e.g., diagnostic labs and medical equipment suppliers) to meet 
increased demand. Indirect spending results when the producers of health services hire more 
staff, purchase equipment, and construct new facilities in which to supply direct services. This 
action in turn causes construction companies and medical suppliers to hire more staff, expand 
their own facilities, and increase capital equipment purchases. Finally, induced spending occurs 
when individuals who are compensated for their provision of direct or indirect services purchase 
goods and services for personal consumption, such as new durable goods (e.g., housing and 
automobiles) and/or non-durable goods and services (e.g., food and clothing expenses). The 
IMPLAN model uses data on new spending flowing through direct, indirect, and induced 
expenditures to estimate the ratio of additional spending to the initial spending inputs. This ratio 
is usually greater than 1.0 and is referred to as an economic multiplier.  
The Maryland Health Care Reform Simulation Model takes into account the effects of 
implementing the ACA on the state economy through a change in state unemployment rate. The 
economic impact of implementing the ACA is captured within the simulation model in an 
iterative process, as follows: 
1. The flow of new funds data (described in Section III, above) from the Expenditure model 
are entered into the IMPLAN model to determine the economic impact, which includes 
estimates of the number of new jobs created in each year. 
2. The numbers of new jobs created in each of the forecast years are entered into a 
spreadsheet to calculate the projected change in unemployment rate in each year, 
assuming that two-thirds of the jobs will be filled from the Maryland labor force, and 
one-third will come from outside labor markets. 
3. The projected change in the unemployment rate for each year is entered into the 
simulation model to produce the flow of new funds data for another round of input in the 
IMPLAN model. This process continues until the Expenditure model outputs and the 
changes in the unemployment rates are identical to their corresponding numbers in the 
previous iteration. 
Economic Activities Generated from Implementing the ACA in Maryland 
The following tables show forecasts of economic variables that will be affected by the 
implementation of the ACA in Maryland. Table 9 presents forecasts of federal subsidies and 
cost-sharing payments to individuals, increases in total health care expenditures, additional 
output generated throughout the state economy, and the associated additional state and local 
taxes that will be generated from implementing the ACA. 
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Table 9. Additional Economic Activity Generated  
from Implementing the ACA (Million $), FYs 2014 - 2020 
 Economic Activity FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 FY 2018 FY 2019 FY 2020 
Federal Subsidies to Individuals 
(Tax Credits) $224 $535 $607 $716 $849 $987 $1,153 
Federal Cost-Sharing Payments to 
Individuals $30 $72 $80 $92 $108 $124 $142 
Total Federal Payments for Cost 
Sharing and Subsidies (Tax Credits)  $254 $607 $687 $808 $957 $1,111 $1,295 
Increase in Total Health Care 
Expenditures  $1,057 $2,085 $2,321 $2,719 $3,111 $3,497 $3,930 
Additional Output Generated $1,174 $2,020 $2,123 $2,421 $2,693 $2,965 $3,283 
Total Additional State and Local 
Taxes Generated (Including 
Premium Assessments) $61 $140 $147 $169 $191 $212 $237 
Table 10 presents the total number of uninsured individuals with and without ACA, the decrease 
in the number of uninsured with the ACA, the number of uninsured individuals as a percentage 
of the total population, the number of new jobs created following implementation of the ACA, 
and the reduction in the state unemployment rate.  
Table 10. Percent Population Uninsured, Number of New Jobs, and Unemployment Rate, 
FYs 2014 - 2020 
  FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 FY 2018 FY 2019 FY 2020 
Total Uninsured without ACA 746,337 735,620 727,950 719,148 718,664 722,369 723,957 
Total Uninsured with ACA 599,003 514,388 488,539 472,749 439,614 415,441 390,352 
Decrease in Number of 
Uninsured with ACA 
147,334 221,232 239,411 246,399 279,050 306,928 333,605 
Uninsured as % of Total 
Population (without ACA) 12.6% 12.3% 12.1% 11.9% 11.8% 11.7% 11.6% 
Uninsured as % of Total 
Population (with ACA) 10.1% 8.6% 8.1% 7.8% 7.2% 6.7% 6.3% 
New Employment due to ACA 9,122 16,117 17,065 19,582 21,895 24,238 26,970 
Unemployment Rate without 
ACA 6.9% 5.8% 5.0% 4.5% 4.3% 4.3% 4.3% 
Unemployment Rate with ACA 6.7% 5.5% 4.6% 4.1% 3.9% 3.8% 3.7% 
Change in Unemployment Rate -0.2% -0.4% -0.4% -0.4% -0.5% -0.5% -0.6% 
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VI. Total Additional Federal Health Expenditures by Provider Type  
For informational purposes, we estimated additional federal health care expenditures for 
implementing the ACA in Maryland. Then, using the data in Table 8, we allocated these 
expenditures to different provider types. These data are not used as input for the IMPAN input-
output model. 
VII. Enrollment Projections 
Enrollment projections are captured on a separate output spreadsheet, entitled “Enrollment 
Projections.” 
A. Insurance Coverage Status of the Maryland Population 
Section A of the Enrollment Projections spreadsheet shows the insurance coverage status of 
Maryland’s population through FY 2020, by major source of coverage, including the uninsured. 
Please note the following: 
1. Health care reform programs start on January 2014. Hence, new Medicaid enrollment 
data for FY 2014 correspond to 6 months of enrollments.  However, Exchange 
enrollment data reflect the “Open Enrollment” period from October 2013 through March 
2014. 
2. There is some overlap in insurance coverage. Coverage by Medicaid and Medicare 
includes individuals who are dually eligible for these programs. Also, commercial 
insurance coverage includes Medicare gap coverage. 
3. The “Number of Uninsured” in Sections A and E reflect an overall picture of insurance 
coverage in Maryland. They take into account the number of uninsured over age 65 and 
changes in coverage from employer sponsored insurance, Medicare, etc.  
A Note on Commercial Insurance Coverage: As described above in the Employment Model 
section, with the implementation of health care reform, some employers (e.g., those with more 
than 50 employees) may decide to pay penalties to the federal government rather than provide 
insurance coverage to their employees. Recent studies by The Henry J. Kaiser Family 
Foundation, the Congressional Budget Office, and Mercer predict some decline in ESI after 
implementation of health care reform. Accordingly, the employer sub-model predicts a decline in 
the percentage of firms that offer health insurance coverage to their employees. In part, the 
projected decline reflects the fact that the national economic recovery will likely occur through 
expansion of employers in the retail and service sectors, which are less likely to offer insurance 
coverage. Furthermore the availability of coverage through the public sector may increase the 
likelihood that some employers will pay penalties to the federal government and stop providing 
insurance coverage to their employees. However, the employees’ take-up of insurance is 
projected to increase with the ACA’s individual mandate.  
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Overall, during the forecast period, total employment in Maryland is projected to increase by 
approximately 126,000, whereas total coverage in commercial insurance, which includes ESI, 
will increase by approximately 40,000.  
B. Medicaid Enrollment 
Section B presents a summary of Medicaid enrollment with and without health care reform, 
including the Medicaid take-up rate with health care reform. Row B.2, entitled “Total Increase in 
Medicaid,” shows the sum of Medicaid expansion and Medicaid woodwork effect enrollees 
(rows D.1 and D.2). The “new Medicaid take-up rates” reflect increases in PAC program 
enrollees (who are not currently counted as having insurance coverage), plus Medicaid 
expansion and woodwork effect enrollees, compared with the total number of uninsured 
individuals with income up to 138 percent of the FPL. The “total Medicaid take-up rates” 
represent participation rates of all Medicaid eligible individuals, including current Medicaid 
enrollees.   
C. Exchange Enrollment 
Section C depicts the number of individuals who would obtain health insurance coverage 
through the Exchange. This section also shows potential Exchange enrollment (remaining U.S. 
citizens with income greater than 138 percent of the FPL, without insurance coverage). The 
Exchange take-up rates compare number of individuals with insurance coverage through the 
Exchange with the total number of uninsured individuals above 138 percent of the FPL. 
D. Health Care Reform Components 
Section D presents the components of health care reform:  
D.1. Medicaid Expansion: Row D.1 includes new expansion enrollees, plus PAC program 
enrollees who will transition to Medicaid expansion. 
D.2. Medicaid Woodwork Effect: The numbers in row D.2 are explained in section I.A.3 
above, which explains the woodwork effect. 
D.3. Exchange (133-200 percent of the FPL) with Subsidy: All of the Exchange 
enrollment projections are based on the Employment model, which itself is based on several 
econometric sub-models. The numbers in row D.3 reflect individuals with incomes between 
138 and 200 percent of the FPL who would receive federal subsidies (tax credits) to purchase 
coverage through the insurance Exchange. 
D.4. Exchange (200-400 percent of the FPL) with Subsidy: The numbers in row D.4 are 
also based on the Employment model. They reflect individuals with incomes between 200 
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and 400 percent of the FPL, who would receive federal subsidies (tax credits) to purchase 
coverage through the insurance Exchange. 
D.5. Exchange (Above 400 percent of the FPL) without Subsidy: The numbers in row D.5 
are also based on the Employment model and represent individuals with incomes above 400 
percent of the FPL who would purchase coverage through the insurance Exchange without 
using a federal subsidy. The model projects that, by FY 2020, approximately 75,000 people 
will purchase coverage through the Exchange without receiving federal subsidies. 
D.6. Small Business Health Options Program (SHOP): Row D.6 shows the projection of 
insurance coverage by small businesses that purchase coverage for their employees through 
the health insurance Exchange. 
Total New Coverage: This row shows the sum of rows D.1 through D.6, described above. 
E. Uninsured 
This section shows the number of uninsured individuals with and without health care reform, and 
their percentages of the total Maryland population. It also shows U.S. citizens who will remain 
uninsured after implementation of health care reform. 
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Appendix A. Summary of Literature Review on Employment-Based Insurance 
In developing the simulation model, we reviewed literature related to workers responsiveness to 
premiums and out-of-pocket costs, the premium elasticity of the demand for health insurance, 
and health insurance take-up rates. This appendix provides a detailed summary of the four key 
articles reviewed: 
 Blumberg, L. J., Nichols, L. M., & Banthin, J. S. (2001, Sept. - Dec.). Worker decisions 
to purchase health insurance. International Journal of Health Care Finance and 
Economics, 1(3/4), 305-325.  
 Hadley, J., & Reschovsky, J. D. (2002, June). Small firms’ demand for health insurance: 
The decision to offer insurance. Inquiry, 39(2), 118-137.  
 Heim, B. T., & Lurie, I. Z. (2009). Do increased premium subsidies affect how much 
health insurance is purchased? Evidence from the self-employed. Journal of Health 
Economics, 28(6), 1197-1210. 
 Liu, S., & Chollet, D. (2006, March 24). Price and income elasticity of the demand for 
health insurance and health care services: A critical review of the literature. 
Washington, DC: Mathematica Policy Research, Inc. Retrieved from 
http://www.mathematica-mpr.com/publications/pdfs/priceincome.pdf 
 Blumberg, Nichols, & Banthin Article 
Study Objective 
This study measured the responsiveness of workers to premium prices. It addressed whether 
workers respond to out-of-pocket costs or to the total premium and how income and health status 
affect employee responses to premiums. 
Data and Methods 
The authors used the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey Household Component (MEPS-
HC) and Insurance Component (MEPS-IC) linked data. This data set offers substantial 
advantages because it contains employer information on workers who do and do not receive 
offers of employer-sponsored insurance (ESI), whether the worker accepts or declines the offer, 
and information on the total and out-of-pocket premiums for up to four plan choices.  
The study used three methodological approaches. The first was a pure approach using a probit 
model that estimated the probability of taking up an insurance offer (i.e., whether or not the 
worker accepts the offer). This model controlled for age, race/ethnicity, gender, marital status, 
presence of children, whether the spouse has an offer, highest education level, fair or poor 
general or mental health or an activity limitation of some kind, the presence of a serious medical 
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condition (at least one from a specific list), whether the worker is full-time, whether the worker 
is white collar, whether the worker lives in a metropolitan statistical area region, whether any 
children in the household are eligible for Medicaid, and income.  
The second methodology was an imputed approach that used an imputation process to assign 
premiums to all workers. First, the authors estimated the probability of taking up an ESI offer for 
all workers who had an offer. In addition to the explanatory variables used in the first approach, 
they also included establishment size, union, industry (including public administration), and 
whether the firm had multiple locations. This equation yields estimates of take-up probability 
and values of the density function of take-up that reflect the "selection" probability of being a 
taking-up worker. Second, they estimated the dollar premium of individuals who took up the ESI 
offer. Third, the authors estimated the probability of taking up an ESI offer by using the imputed 
premiums. 
Findings 
 ESI take-up elasticities were low: -0.0026 for single workers, -0.0324 for family 
candidates with single premium, and -0.0443 for family candidates with family premium. 
 Single workers were less responsive to premium prices than family candidates.  
 Although the linked sample is not completely representative of workers, it  produced 
estimates of price elasticity that are indistinguishable from those adjusted for potential 
non-response bias.  
 Elasticities with imputed premiums were higher than they were under the direct 
estimation approach, but still quite low. 
 Workers were more responsive to out-of-pocket premiums than to total premiums. 
Hadley & Reschovsky Article 
Study Objective 
This study estimated the premium elasticity of demand for health insurance for small firms (i.e., 
responsiveness of offer of insurance coverage to premium variations). The study also examined 
how this elasticity varies across firms with different characteristics. 
Data and Methods 
The authors used data from the 1997 Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Employer Health 
Insurance Survey (Community Tracking Study) and other sources. The Community Tracking 
Study Household Survey and Insurance Follow Back Survey were linked and used to create new 
variables, including the availability of public insurance, health care through safety net, the price 
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of non-group insurance, average worker income, workers’ family health status, local market 
concentration, each household survey respondent’s insurance coverage, and hospital costs. 
The Insurance Survey sampled 11,613 small, private firms, and the Household Survey sampled 
54,000 individuals. Both samples were drawn as representatives of 60 randomly selected local 
health care markets, defined as Metropolitan Statistical Areas or groups of nonmetropolitan 
counties.  
The authors made three theoretical assumptions:  
1. Firms will offer insurance if their employees’ collective reservation price is greater than 
the price at which the employer can make insurance available.  
2. Employees will compare expected utilities across discrete insurance choices and select 
ESI if its expected utility is greater than the other options.  
3. Firms offer insurance when the demand price just equals (or exceeds) the supply price. 
The authors used three equations and sensitivity analyses. Noting that premiums are not observed 
for firms that do not offer insurance, the authors used the two-stage Heckman procedure 
(reduced-form probit offer equation and selection-corrected premium equation) to account for 
the fact that premiums are observed only for establishments that offer insurance. The reduced-
form offer model (probit regression) estimated the predicted probability of offering insurance. 
After adjusting for selection bias, the premium model (log-transformed ordinary least square) 
estimated the selection-corrected premium. Two equations were estimated jointly, using 
maximum likelihood estimation. Then, the selection-corrected ESI premium was plugged into 
the structural offer equation as an instrumental variable. The third equation estimated the 
predicted probability of offering insurance. Additionally, the study re-estimated the structural 
offer equation using interaction variables to allow the premium coefficient to vary by 
establishment size, the percentage of workers who receive low wages, and the estimated average 
family income per worker. 
Findings 
 Adjusting for selection bias, the predicted average single monthly premium for firms that 
did not offer insurance was greater than the predicted monthly premium for firms that did 
offer insurance. 
 The correlation between the reduced-form offer and the premium equations was negative 
and statistically significant (p = .01). The negative correlation suggests that firms that do 
not offer insurance face higher premiums than firms that do offer insurance, and that the 
unobservable factors influencing both the offer decision and the premium are correlated 
between the two equations. 
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 In the structural offer equation, the premium for ESI was negative and highly significant, 
but moderate in magnitude. The corresponding elasticity, -0.54, suggests that a 10 percent 
decrease in the average monthly premium is predicted to increase the probability of 
offering insurance by approximately 5.4 percent. 
 In general, firms’ responsiveness to changes in premiums varied by firm characteristics. 
The smallest establishments (those with less than 10 employees) had the lowest offer rate, 
faced the highest average premium, and were most responsive to a reduction in premium, 
with an elasticity estimate of 2.63. 
 Establishments with a high proportion (> 75 percent) of low-wage workers or low 
average income per worker showed higher price elasticities, ranging from -0.88 to -1.18. 
Heim & Lurie Article 
Study Objective 
This study examined amendments made to the 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA86), which increased 
the deductibility of health insurance premiums from 60 percent in 1999 to 70 percent in 2002, 
and to 100 percent in 2003 for the self-employed. Using a panel of tax returns, the authors 
investigated how these changes affected the probability of taking up health insurance and the 
level of health insurance purchased. The following research questions guided the study: 
 Does a change in the after-tax price of health insurance relative to medical expenditures 
affect the probability of purchasing health insurance?  
 Does a change in the after-tax price of insurance affect the quantity of health insurance 
purchased? 
Data and Methods 
The authors used a six-year panel of data for any taxpayer sampled in 1999 who filed a tax return 
over the five subsequent years. The authors drew a stratified, random sample of taxpayers in 
1999 and included tax returns from any member of this sample over the next five years. More 
than 65,000 taxpayers were observed in the sample across all six years. The final sample for the 
take-up specification included 14,354 individuals, and the sample for the amount specification 
contained 1,692 individuals. 
The authors used two estimation strategies, introduced by Gruber and Poterba (2004): 1) a linear 
probability model for all observations and 2) a linear fixed effect model conditional on 
observations for individuals who purchased health insurance. Dependent variables included the 
fraction of tax returns claiming self-employed health insurance deductions and the amount of 
self-employed health insurance deductions. Independent variables included relative price, age 
squared, number of children on the tax return, income, filing status, and year. Out of those 
independent variables, the main covariate of interest was the after-tax price of health care. The 
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relative price was defined as the after-tax price of purchasing health care through an insurance 
plan relative to the after-tax price of purchasing health care directly if uninsured, expressed as a 
ratio.  
Findings 
Heim and Lurie found evidence that a decline in the after-tax price of health insurance for the 
self-employed increases the likelihood of taking up health insurance and the amount of health 
insurance purchased.  
 In the take-up specification, they found an overall elasticity of approximately -0.3 
(statistically significant). A decrease in the price of insurance led to a higher insurance 
take-up rate, with an estimated elasticity of −0.316. It was noted that elasticity was higher 
for single taxpayers compared with married couples.  
 In the amount specification, the authors found a highly significant elasticity of 
approximately 0.7 for self-employed taxpayers.  
In conclusion, the study results suggested that changing the price of health insurance through a 
deduction had moderate effects on both the number of self-employed taxpayers purchasing 
health insurance and the amount of insurance purchased.  
Liu & Chollet Article 
Study Objective 
Elasticity of demand is defined as “a measure of consumer response to a change in the price of a 
product, the price of related products, or personal income” (Liu & Chollet, 2006). Generally, the 
demand for health insurance and health care services is not sensitive to changes in price (price-
inelastic), and variation in the estimated elasticities is large. This study reviewed more than 80 
studies on estimates of the elasticity of demand for health insurance and health care services, 
summarized the key findings from these studies, and identified methodological challenges and 
gaps in the literature.  
Findings on Elasticity of Demand for Health Insurance 
The authors found that the literature on the elasticity of the demand for health insurance indicates 
a range of elasticity estimates, including: 
 Estimates of the price elasticity of employer offers of health insurance range from -0.14 
to -5.8, but most of them approximate around -0.6. Small firms are less likely to offer 
insurance, and their price elasticity of demand is greater than that of larger firms. 
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 Among workers who are offered insurance by their employers, the price elasticity of 
take-up is relatively low, with most estimates falling below -0.1. 
 Depending on how many alternative insurance options are presented to an employee, the 
price elasticity of demand among insured workers for any one option may be relatively 
high, but its absolute value is still less than 0.1. 
 In the non-group market, estimates of the price elasticity of demand usually range from   
-0.2 to -0.6. 
 A few studies suggest that elderly beneficiaries are less responsive than nonelderly 
consumers to the price of insurance. 
 Limited evidence implies that lower-income consumers are more price sensitive than 
higher-income consumers. 
 There is no evidence to suggest that employers as a whole are less likely to offer 
coverage when a greater proportion of their employees or dependents are eligible for 
Medicaid, although small, low-wage employers may be less likely to do so. 
The few observational studies estimating the income elasticity of demand consistently indicate 
that the demand for health insurance is inelastic with respect to differences in consumer income. 
These studies typically report that the income elasticity of demand for health insurance is less 
than 0.1. 
Findings on Elasticity of Demand for Health Care Services 
The authors reported that research shows that the demand for insured health care services is 
price-inelastic. Most estimates of the price elasticity of demand for health care services in 
general (or total spending) are approximately -0.2. Estimated price elasticities differ by type of 
service, but the differences are not generally significant. Key findings include: 
 Insured consumers may decrease their overall health spending by 2 percent in response to 
a 10 percent increase in the price of health care (net of insurance coverage). Price-
induced changes in demand have been attributed more to changes in the probability of 
using any care than to changes in the amount of care used once it is accessed. 
 Low-income consumers are more sensitive to changes in the price of care. Consequently, 
they may be more likely to experience adverse consequences from higher cost sharing. 
Recent studies have found that there are service-specific differences in the price elasticity of 
demand, for example:  
 Estimates of the price elasticity of the demand for prescription drugs are usually in the 
range of -0.1 to -0.6. The introduction of multi-tier formularies reduces drug 
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expenditures. However, direct-to-consumer advertising may significantly reduce the price 
elasticity of demand for at least some prescription drugs. 
 Compared with the demand for inpatient services, the demand for outpatient services may 
be more price-sensitive. However, the evidence suggests that greater use of inpatient care 
is consistently associated with greater use of outpatient care. 
 The limited evidence suggests that the demand for mental health care, dental services and 
long-term care services among insured consumers may be more price elastic than the 
demand for other types of care. 
Estimates of the income elasticity of demand for health care services based on observational 
studies consistently range from 0.0 to 0.2, suggesting that consumers do not use more health care 
as their income rises. However, some studies that have estimated income elasticity by using 
time-series or aggregated state- or country-level data have produced higher estimates of income 
elasticity—in the range of 0.2 to 1.5. 
Methodological Challenges  
The authors note that there are methodological challenges to estimating the elasticity of demand 
for health insurance or health care services, including: 
 Price is unobservable for people who do not have insurance or do not use health care 
services. Many researchers use a Heckman two-stage procedure (first estimating the 
probability of firms offering insurance and then the price) to impute the unobserved price 
offered to those who decline coverage. However, it is critical to select explanatory 
variables that should be included in the imputation of unobserved price. Moreover, using 
imputed premiums for group coverage provided larger elasticity estimates with respect to 
employees’ take-up of coverage. 
 Price may be endogenous to factors that are correlated with demand. It is difficult to 
specify a model that adequately controls for these factors in estimating the elasticity of 
demand. In most observational studies, researchers have developed complex statistical 
models, including instrumental-variable estimations that address endogenous outcome 
variables. An instrumental variable must be correlated with the endogenous variable itself 
(in this case, price), but uncorrelated with the outcome variable (i.e., demand), except 
through the endogenous variable. However, it is extremely difficult to find such 
instruments. In contrast, studies with a natural experimental design usually carry little 
risk of endogeneity. Specifically for panel data, researchers can use a difference-in-
difference method to compare pre- and post-treatment periods and control for any time 
trend as well as any permanent average difference between the treatment and control 
groups. Difference-in-difference estimation assumes that a parallel trend would have 
occurred for the treatment and control groups in the absence of the treatment, all else 
being equal. It yields a biased estimate of demand elasticity if this assumption fails. 
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 Unobserved factors of demand can cause underspecified models and yield biased 
estimates of demand. The most common source of data used to estimate elasticity is the 
U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey (CPS). This survey includes multiple 
years of data and a large number of observations in each year. However, most of the 
population sample changes from year to year. Furthermore, the CPS offers information 
only about whether household members are covered by health insurance, not information 
about the cost or design of their coverage. However, the Medical Expenditure Panel 
Survey (MEPS) does provide panel data, although it contains a much smaller sample than 
CPS. MEPS includes information about employees’ insurance options and coverage 
(such as premiums and coinsurance rates), as well as personal information (such as 
income and assets, health status, and health care utilization and expenditures). Many 
researchers have tried to link CPS data across years or statistically match CPS to MEPS 
to create data sets adequate to their research needs. 
 Research information about provider-induced demand or supply-side behavioral changes 
in response to price changes is very limited. No studies have considered supply-side 
factors in their models. 
Gaps in the Literature 
The authors described numerous gaps in the literature on estimating and applying elasticity 
estimates, including: 
 Because observations on the options available to consumers and time-variant behaviors 
are lacking, an omitted variable bias, or endogeneity bias, in estimating elasticity occurs.  
 Many statistical models have been used to address methodological challenges due to 
limited data. At the same time, there is ongoing demand to link multiple sources of data 
to estimate consumer response in complex markets over time. 
 There are few analyses of the potential demand for high-deductible insurance products by 
the general public or the change in their use of care once enrolled. 
 Consumer responses to improved coverage for mental health, long-term care, and other 
types of care – such as preventive services or specific types of prescription drugs – merit 
further research to support improvements in the design of public and private health care 
coverage.  
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Appendix B. Simulation Model Crosswalk to the Economic Impact Model 
The Maryland Health Care Reform Simulation Model estimates new expenditures in the health 
care sector due to implementation of the ACA. The IMPLAN economic input-output model takes 
output from the simulation model, in aggregate dollars, as input with which to estimate the 
potential impact of health care spending on the Maryland economy. The simulation model 
predicts aggregate spending in all segments of the health care sector combined. However, the 
IMPLAN model uses health care spending in related industry categories, mainly: physician 
services, hospital care, pharmaceutical drugs, and other health services including diagnostic 
services. Therefore, outputs of the Maryland simulation model are mapped to the IMPLAN 
industry categories to enable IMPLAN to estimate the broader economic impacts of changes in 
health care spending.  
We consulted several sources to facilitate the mapping of health care spending categories and 
estimate the shares of health care spending for newly insured individuals in Maryland. 
Maryland’s Medicaid MCOs make periodic Health Finance Management Reports (HFMRs) to 
the state that provide detailed allocations of health care expenditures by the provider types that 
render services to MCO enrollees. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) 
provided another source of data in its National Health Expenditure (NHE) accounts, which 
permit a comparison of the HFMRs estimates with nationwide health care spending by provider 
type. In addition, the Milliman Medical Index from the actuarial consulting firm Milliman 
provided a source for estimates of spending by provider group for families covered under 
employment-based insurance. 
Table B.1 outlines the estimated shares of total health care spending for each provider type from 
each of the data sources presented. The last column shows an estimate of predicted shares of new 
spending used for the Maryland model, based on HFMRs of the Medicaid MCOs. These 
percentages are used to allocate estimates of total new health care expenditures by provider type, 
which are then used as input to the IMPLAN model. In the Expenditure model, administrative 
costs are estimated separately from Medical costs, and IMPLAN has a separate input category 
for them. Hence, they are not included in Table B.1. 
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Table B.1. Expenditures by Provider Type as a  
Percentage of Total Health Care Expenditures 
Provider 
Data Source  
Milliman CMS NHE  
Maryland 
HFMR  
Physician 32.6% 28.4% 22.8% 
Dentist N/A 5.8% 0.3% 
Other Professions  N/A 3.8% N/A  
Total, All Professional Services 32.6% 37.9% 23.1% 
Inpatient Hospital 31.3% 41.1% 38.9% 
Outpatient Hospital 17.6% N/A 22.6% 
Prepaid Inpatient Health Plan N/A   N/A  N/A 
Total, Hospital Services 48.8% 41.1% 61.5% 
Total Pharmacy 14.7% 13.4% 9.6% 
Total, Other Health Services 3.8% 7.6%  5.8% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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